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#### The upsurge of Anti-Muslim rhetoric has turned the political sphere into an echo chamber of racism, sacrificing any remaining semblance of critical thought on the altar of bipartisanship.

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[Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, formerly Boston University, Miami University, Penn State University, "Breivik's Fundamentalist War on Politics, and Ours," August 3, <http://www.truth-out.org/breiviks-fundamentalist-war-politics-and-ours/1312390288>]

The tragic slayings in Norway raise anew serious questions about domestic terrorism and its roots in right-wing ideology and fundamentalist movements. Breivik's manifesto "2083" and his murderous actions remind us of the degree to which right-wing extremism is more than a minor threat to American security - a fact we have been all too often willing to forget. The foundation of such violence, and the insistent threat it poses to democracy, is not to be found in its most excessive and brutal acts, but in the absolutist worldview that produces it. As the Swedish religion scholar Mattias Gardell insists, "The terrorist attacks in Oslo were not an outburst of irrational madness, but a calculated act of political violence. The carnage was a manifestation of a certain logic that can and should be explained, if we want to avoid a repetition."[5] Elements of such a logic are not only on full display in American society, but are also gaining ground. The influence of extremist and fundamentalist ideologies and worldviews - whether embodied in religion, politics, militarism or the market - can be seen currently in the rhetoric at work at the highest levels of government. How else to explain that just one day after the deficit settlement in Washington, Republican Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado Springs, in an interview with a Denver radio station, referred to President Obama as a "tar baby."[6] It is hard to mistake the racist nature of the use of the term "tar baby," given its long association as a derogatory term for African-Americans. Soon afterward, Pat Buchanan wrote a column that began with a shockingly overt racist comment in which he writes: "Mocked by The Wall Street Journal and Sen. John McCain as the little people of the Harry Potter books, the Tea Party 'Hobbits' are indeed returning to Middle Earth - to nail the coonskin to the wall."[7] What is clear about this type of racist discourse is that it creates a climate where hatred and violence become legitimate options. It also indicates that the violence of extremist rhetoric is alive and well in American politics; yet, it is barely noticed, and produces almost no public outrage. Moreover, this type of fundamentalism and extremism is about more than just the rise of the Tea Party. It is a growing and ominous force in everyday life, politics, and in the media. A rigid, warlike mentality has created an atmosphere in which dialogue is viewed as a weakness and compromise understood as personal failing. As Richard Hofstadter argued over 50 years ago, fundamentalist thinking is predicated on an anti-intellectualism and the refusal to engage other points of view.[8] The other is not confronted as someone worthy of respect, but as an enemy, someone who constitutes a threat, who must be utterly vanquished. Michel Foucault goes further and insists that fundamentalists do not confront the other as: a partner in the search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat.... There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible.[9] Missing from the fundamentalist toolbox is the necessity for self-reflection, thinking critically about the inevitable limitations of one's arguments, or being morally accountable to the social costs of harboring racist ideologies and pushing policies that serve to deepen racist exclusions, mobilize fear, and legitimate a growing government apparatus of punishment and imprisonment.[10] What connects the moral bankruptcy of right-wing Republicans who embrace violent imagery in order to mobilize their followers with the mindset of extremists like Breivik is that they share a deep romanticization of violence that is valorized by old and new fundamentalisms, whose endpoint is a death-dealing blow to the welfare state, young people, immigrants, Muslims, and others deemed dangerous and, so, "disposable." It is not surprising that Breivik's radical anti-Islamic views draw repeatedly on the work of a number of American extremists, including Andrew Bostrom, David Horowitz and Daniel Pipes. In contrast to comforting media illusions, we are not talking about the emergence of right-wing lone wolfs who explode in a frenzy of hate and violence, but an increasing pervasive - though not yet dominant - fundamentalist worldview that embraces a circle of certainty, evokes a Manichean struggle between good and evil, espouses an anti-intellectual populism, calls for the banishing of critical intellectuals from the academy, and rails against critical academic fields such as postcolonial studies, feminist studies, peace studies and ethnic studies. And while many of these religious and secular fundamentalists may not argue directly for real violence, they spew out a steady stream of hatred that created the conditions for such violence. I am not suggesting that Breivik's actions can be linked directly to right-wing extremism in the Congress and broader society, but it is not altogether unjust to suggest that what they share are a number of core concerns, including a view of immigrants as a threat to American nationalism, an embrace of anti-Muslim rhetoric, a strong espousal of militarism, market fundamentalism, hyper-nationalism and support for a host of retrograde social policies that embrace weakening unions, the rolling back of women's rights, and a deep distrust of equality as a foundation of democracy itself.[11] Chris Hedges outlines the elements of such a fundamentalism when he writes: Fundamentalists have no interest in history, culture or social or linguistic differences.... They are provincials.... They peddle a route to assured collective deliverance. And they sanction violence and the physical extermination of other human beings to get there. All fundamentalists worship the same gods - themselves. They worship the future prospect of their own empowerment. They view this empowerment as a necessity for the advancement and protection of civilization or the Christian state. They sanctify the nation. They hold up the ability the industrial state has handed to them as a group and as individuals to shape the world according to their vision as evidence of their own superiority.... The self-absorbed world view of these fundamentalists brings smiles of indulgence from the corporatists who profit, at our expense, from the obliteration of moral and intellectual inquiry.[12] At work here is a moral and political absolutism that more and more dehumanizes young people, immigrants, feminists, Muslims, and others relegated to the outside of the narrow parameters of a public sphere preserved for white, Christian and male citizens. Breivik acted upon his hatred of Muslims, leftists and immigrants by murdering young people whose activities at a Labor Party Camp suggested they might usher in a future at odds with his deeply racist and authoritarian views. As Scott Shane, writing in The New York Times, put it, and it bears repeating, Breivik, "was deeply influenced by a small group of American bloggers and writers who have warned for years about the threat from Islam."[13] Breivik names, among others, the right-wing extremist Pamela Geller, "who has called President Obama 'President Jihad' and claimed that Arab language classes are a plot to subvert the United States."[14] More recently, Geller's xenophobic blog, Atlas Shrugs, has repeatedly attempted, "to unearth Obama's relationship to Islam [and prove that] Islam is a political ideology [that is] incompatible with democracy."[15] Geller's racist and hate-filled blog implied that Breivik's attack on the Labor youth camp may have been somehow justified because, as she puts it, "the victims would have grown up to become 'future leaders of the party responsible for flooding Norway with Muslims who refuse to assimilate, who commit major violence against Norwegian natives including violent gang rapes, with impunity, and who live on the dole."[16] Atlas vomits! As ThinkProgress' Lee Fang points out, Geller attempts to prove her point by posting a picture taken on the island camp a few hours before Breivik's murderous rampage, and she writes, without any sense of remorse, "Note the faces which are more Mlddle [sic] Easter or mixed than pure Norwegian."[17] While such shocking expressions of racism cannot be directly connected to all forms of fundamentalism, there is nothing in those who espouse this worldview that renders them open or willing to exercise the judgment, critical inquiry, and thoughtfulness necessary to counter and resist such views and the violence to which they often lead. Such worldviews operate on the side of certainty, wrap themselves in a logic that is considered unquestionable, refuse compromise and dialogue, and often invoke a militarized vocabulary to define themselves as soldiers fighting a war for Western civilization. This is a worldview in which ignorance and impotence join with violence, sanctified by a fundamentalism that thrives on conformity and authoritarian populism. Breivik was not a typical right-wing terrorist. He refused to endorse a strategy that made a claim for racial superiority on biological grounds; more specifically, he recognized that it was not wise tactically, "to oppose immigration and Islam on racial grounds (an argument that would attract few people.)"[18] Instead, he admired and adopted an ideology from those far-right groups that revised old racist beliefs and adopted a new anti-Muslim narrative in which immigrants and those deemed other, "are not biologically inferior, but they are culturally incompatible."[19] In this case, cultural difference rather than biological degeneration is viewed as a threat to democracy.[20] While most right-wing politicians, individuals and groups denounce the horrendous violence perpetrated by Breivik, they nonetheless produce and contribute to a culture of violence and rhetoric of demonization that undermines respect for difference, democratic values, and a capacious notion of personal and social responsibility. As recently stated in a study by the Anti-Defamation League: The hateful rhetoric around the immigration debate has gone beyond the rallies, lobbying and media appearances by anti-immigration advocates. A number of media personalities in television and radio, as well as political leaders, have adopted the same language when discussing immigration issues in this country. These extend from [former] "national TV correspondent Lou Dobbs to more extreme political commentator Patrick Buchanan to local radio personalities to members of Congress such as Tom Tancredo and Steve King ... the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric has permeated the culture in our country."[21] There are few degrees of separation between far-right extremists such as the late Madeleine Cosman, an alleged medical lawyer, and radio and TV personality Lou Dobbs, yet both have argued that Mexican immigrants are criminals and carriers of diseases such as leprosy. This type of hysterical xenophobia can also be found in the words and actions of New York Republican Rep. Peter T. King, who, as chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, has opened hearings on the radicalization of Muslim Americans. This type of racist hysteria (that precludes investigation of other forms of radicalization) is commonplace in America, and is aided and abetted by conservatives such as Buchanan, who writes columns such as "Say goodbye to Los Angeles" filled with apocalyptic visions of the United States being taken over by people of color.[22] This type of rhetoric is easy politics. As such, it is widely used in the United States, and can also be found in the work of the late Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington, [23] anti-Muslim bloggers, Christian fundamentalists, Fox News commentators and in anti-immigration policies initiated in a variety of states, with one of the most pernicious examples introduced by state legislators in Arizona. Fundamentalism is as home grown as the Ku Klux Klan and white militia groups, and can be found across a range of groups extending from the Christian right to secular fundamentalists such as Sam Harris.[24] This type of bigotry and the life-crushing policies it produces can give rise to and spread like a disease; its targets seem to multiply every day in the United States. Indeed, one could argue that the only successful (though hardly cost-effective) war the United States has waged since the 1980's has been against poor men of color, who now represent 70 percent of all inmates in US prisons.[25] Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) populations are indeed another target of hate, captured for example in one of Buchanan's recent columns, in which he writes: "What is the moral basis of the argument that homosexuality is normal, natural and healthy? In recent years, it has been associated with high levels of AIDS and enteric diseases, and from obits in gay newspapers, early death. Where is the successful society where homosexual marriage was normal?"[26] There is also the war on youth, which is now in high gear with the implosion of social safety nets, decent housing, health care and the simultaneous rise of the punishing state, this the result of the conservative takeover of a number of state legislators and governorships by radical conservatives and the control of the House of Representatives by right-wing extremists. This isn't the kind of direct warfare we saw in Norway, but it is warfare just the same, less spectacular in the short run, but with more casualties in the long run. Consider the actions of Jan Brewer, the governor of Arizona, in, "spearheading a bill to eliminate KidsCare, the state's Medicaid Program for children ... though twenty three percent of Arizona's children live in poverty."[27] What does one say about Gov. Paul LePage of Maine, who, "recently signed into law a bill that eases child labor laws, lowering restrictions on the hours and days teenagers can work."[28] It gets worse. Nevada Democratic Sen. Harry Reid signaled the current extremism of the Republican Party by highlighting that the legislation they have recently introduced would cut or eliminate Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Over 1.7 million kids would lose health insurance by 2016.[29] Common Dreams reported that, "GOP Florida lawmakers have rejected over $50 million in much-needed federal child-abuse prevention money because it was part of Obama's healthcare reform package."[30] Violence becomes news when its most extreme registers erupt in waves of bloodshed. Yet, there is another kind of violence that can rightfully be viewed as a form of domestic terrorism. It can be seen in an array of statistics that point to the current war on youth: 43.6 millions Americans live in poverty and one child in five is poor; "infant mortality, low birth weight and child deaths under five are ranked higher in the United States as compared to other Western nations and Japan. Among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only Mexico, Turkey and the Slovak Republic have higher infant mortality than the U.S."[31] As a result of the corruption and crimes of bankers, Wall Street, and the right-wing politicians who have bailed them out and legitimated the deregulatory policies that produced such hardships, millions of people are unemployed and have lost their homes, all of which impacts not just on adults, but on generations of young people condemned to poverty, homelessness, unemployment and a future without hope. This is the violence legitimated by right-wing conservative policies, which contribute to shocking levels of inequality in which the wealth of Hispanics and blacks fell by 66 percent and 55 percent, respectively, between 2005 and 2009. The United States has the highest inequality and poverty rate among the industrialized nations. Such statistics point to policies that are not simply mean-spirited; they are cruel, sadistic and dishonor the government's obligations to young people and politically marginalized populations. Economist Paul Krugman rightly claims that, "The G.O.P. budget plan isn't a good-faith effort to put America's fiscal house in order; it's voodoo economics, with an extra dose of fantasy, and a large helping of mean-spiritedness."[32] Krugman goes further and argues that the American government is being held hostage by a group of Republican extremists who purposely want to make government dysfunctional. Far-right zealots such a Michele Bachmann and her conservative evangelical compatriots embody a mode of fundamentalism that promotes gay-bashing, a disdain for social protections and a deep hatred of government, which is rooted less in political and economic analyses than in biblical stricture and religious values.[33] Yet, such commitments are not marginal to American politics. For example, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) stated that, "After years of discussions and months of negotiations, I have little question that as long as this president is in the Oval Office, a real solution is unattainable."[34] There is more than a covert racism at work here, given the extremist views about Obama that inform much of the Republican Party, there is also a cult of certainty that has given political extremism a degree of normalcy, while at the same time indicating the degree to which such thought now permeates American society. In fact, absolutist thought is now driving official state and federal policy and pushing an alleged liberal Obama to a far-right position, all in the name of a cowardly appeal to bipartisanship and a deeply flawed notion of consensus. Not only is the power of market-driven casino capitalism at its zenith, but a culture of fundamentalism has become the driving force in American politics that is only a few degrees away from an outright embrace of a 21st century authoritarianism. What is interesting, and quite frightening, about Krugman's analysis of the growing fundamentalism and religiosity of American politics is his insightful claim that such a move is being abetted by a dominant media apparatus that views extremist ideas within what he calls a "cult of balance," in which such views are treated as just one more legitimate opinion. Listen to Brian Williams, the NBC News anchor, on any given night, and you get firsthand one of the worst offenders of the cult of balance. Krugman is worth citing on this issue. He writes: News reports portray the parties as equally intransigent; pundits fantasize about some kind of "centrist" uprising, as if the problem was too much partisanship on both sides. Some of us have long complained about the cult of "balance," the insistence on portraying both parties as equally wrong and equally at fault on any issue, never mind the facts. I joked long ago that if one party declared that the earth was flat, the headlines would read, "Views Differ on Shape of Planet." But would that cult still rule in a situation as stark as the one we now face, in which one party is clearly engaged in blackmail and the other is dickering over the size of the ransom? The answer, it turns out, is yes. And this is no laughing matter: The cult of balance has played an important role in bringing us to the edge of disaster. For when reporting on political disputes always implies that both sides are to blame, there is no penalty for extremism.[35] All of which is to say that there is another side to right-wing fundamentalism that needs to be addressed outside of its xenophobic, homophobic, antigovernment, antifeminist and youth-hating beliefs, which have become increasingly normalized, legitimated and defined loosely as just another view in American society. Yet, this is about more than the rise of a hate-filled fundamentalism and populist anti-intellectualism that scorns debate, dialogue and critical exchange. It is also symptomatic of the end of politics, and, by default, signals the death knell of democracy itself. Politics becomes moribund when dialogue, critical exchange, reasoned arguments, facts, logic and critical modes of education become objects of derision and contempt. Right-wing extremism is nourished when the formative culture that makes democracy possible is defunded, commercialized and diminished - when it is eroded and increasingly ceases to exist. Right-wing extremism and the fundamentalist logic it embraces is not merely a security threat; it does not simply produce terrorists. It actively wages a war on the very possibility of judgment, informed argument and critical agency itself. It opens the door for lies and omissions parading as truth, ignorance celebrated as informed reason and the dismissal of science as just another worthy opinion. In the end, violence emerges as a legitimate strategy to weed out those not on the side of an unquestioning moralism. Education redefined as training, fear driven by political illiteracy and authoritarian populism parading as the will of the people speak to what philosopher Hannah Arendt once called "dark times," to refer to that period in history in which the forces of totalitarianism and fascism extinguished reason, thoughtful exchange, discerning judgments, justice and truth. We are once again in on the brink of "dark times" and the clock is not merely ticking. The alarm is blaring, and yet the American public refuses to wake from a nightmare that is about to become a dreadful and punishing reality. Of course, history is open, and we have witnessed in Egypt, Iran, Syria, Greece and other countries, men, women and young people who have refused the established and beckoning forms of authoritarianism, giving rise to collective revolts that display immense courage and hope. It is past time for Americans to look beyond existing forms of leadership, the tired vocabularies of established political parties, the thoughtless stenography dispersed by mainstream media and the official view of democracy as just another form of consumerism. It is time to look to those struggles abroad that both embrace democracy and embody a form of civic courage in which thinking and morality inform each other in support of a world where young people can flourish, politics becomes a noble practice and democracy has a future.

#### This is evident in status quo detention policy. Indefinite detention represents an attempt to single out, debase and eradicate Muslim culture.

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[Hilal, “Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia”, TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 21, Spring 2012, RSR]

The combination of prolonged illegal detention, a new interpretation of ¶ torture, and cruel interrogation practices has led to widespread criticism in ¶ the United States and abroad, both by human rights organizations and by ¶ foreign governments.149 “According to a report by Human Rights First, close ¶ to one hundred people have died in U.S. custody; the Pentagon classifies ¶ thirty-four of those cases as criminal homicides. At least eight of those people ¶ were literally tortured to death.”150 The most shocking treatment was ¶ exposed in photographs from Abu Ghraib that were published in mainstream ¶ media in the United States and worldwide.151 Various human rights ¶ organizations and the Pentagon rushed to investigate the atrocities. The ¶ resulting reports were revealing. Abuses were widespread, not only in Iraq ¶ but in Afghanistan and Guantanamo as well.¶ 152 This incident is considered ¶ something of a game changer in relation to the popularity of the Iraq war. ¶ After Abu Ghraib, much of the American public lost its confidence in military ¶ practices. This was a big turning point against the Bush Administration ¶ among the American political establishment. Right after this incident,¶ Senator McCain and his supporters introduced an anti-torture amendment. ¶ However, despite all these pictures that became disturbing icons of the¶ Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, the ¶ general public did not appreciate a deeper problematic aspect of these ¶ practices: “U.S. soldiers and interrogators singled out Islamic culture in their ¶ efforts to humiliate and mistreat prisoners.”153 “The experiences of U.S. ¶ Captain James Yee, a West Point graduate and convert to Islam, offer ¶ compelling evidence of how, throughout the post-9/11 period, antagonism ¶ toward prisoners, and efforts to break them, rested upon the debasement of ¶ Muslim practices and religious items.”154 Another disturbing incident¶ happened in Afghanistan. American soldiers ¶ burned and desecrated the bodies of two Taliban fighters, ¶ publicly placing their corpses “facing west,” in an apparent, deliberate mocking of the Islamic requirement to face Mecca ¶ during prayer. Elsewhere, female soldiers have been used to ¶ humiliate detainees by touching them and by making them ¶ undress . . . and [using] sexually provocative tactics . . . meant ¶ to violate Muslim taboos about contact between the sexes and ¶ religious purity.155¶ Using woman interrogators in such a way is also extremely humiliating ¶ for American female military officers, but again this issue never became a ¶ public concern as subordination and humiliation and dehumanization of ¶ women in the military. To draw a fine line between the war on terror and a ¶ war on Islam obviously was not one of the concerns of the American military. ¶ Moreover, these tactics have been used to dehumanize detainees, using their ¶ belief as a weapon against them.156 In Iraq, the attitudes of American ¶ soldiers to the Iraqi people provide abundant evidence that racial ¶ subordination of the Iraqi people was common knowledge.

#### Our detention policy is founded upon the basis of racial profiling. It creates a perpetual security state that dehumanizes the Brown Other.

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[Judith, “INDEFINITE DETENTION”, La Rivista del Manifesto, Numero 35, 2003, RSR]

The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of “deeming,” is potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of hundreds of Arab residents or Arab-American citizens, sometimes on the basis of last names alone; the attacks on individuals of Middle-East descent on U.S. streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. Indeed, when Rumsfeld has sent the U.S. into periodic panics or “alerts,” he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well-versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani-Americans.. Although “deeming” someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging, that is, prejudicial forms of suspicion in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, becomes targeted by this government mandate to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the U.S. becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain “indefinite containment” takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airplanes, on the street, on the workplace. A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag becomes read as a sign of sympathy with Al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless rules public culture - and business interests - at this time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be shown or proven to anyone to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos released by the Department of Defense of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo.

#### Debate reinforces this by privileging seeking truth through rational forms of deliberation divorced from social conditions. This props up the centralized, secular state, which discriminates against followers of so-called “irrational religions” in the name of stability. Even institutional appeals to religious tolerance are used to demobilize opposition and preserve the state’s power.

Asad 93 (Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Johns Hopkins University Press - A (1993), http://100.markelmore.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/05/01\_asad\_Genealogies-of-Religion\_-all.pdf, da 11-15-13) PC

The rationality of criticism, according to Kant, consists in the fact that the statuses and passions of those involved have nothing to do¶ with judging the truth of an argument. The validity of any judgment requires that one abstract oneself from all empirical interests. Yet,¶ significantly, the idea that arrival at the truth depends on public argument, on free and open examination that is independent of social¶ conditions, does not always appear to prevail with the Enlightenment thinker. In an unpublished justification of his promise to the king not to¶ write again on religious matters, Kant noted: “Repudiation and denial of one’s inner conviction are evil, but silence in a case like the present¶ one is the duty of a subject; and while all that one says must be true, this does not mean that it is one’s duty to speak out the whole truth in¶ public” (cited in Reiss 1991, 2). In this case, it seems, (religious) truth stands independently of public argument because it has been translated¶ as belief (which, unlike knowledge, is based on personal experience), and public expressions of personal belief (although not the belief itself)¶ must always defer to that public authority which is known as the state. For belief in the final analysis is not “objective knowledge” (science),¶ it is merely “opinion.” Thus, no damage is done to truth if opinion is denied free play in public.¶ This position was in keeping with Kant’s Pietist upbringing, which, according to Cassirer, gave its adherents “that calm, that¶ cheerfulness, that inner peace that is disturbed by no passion” (cited in Gay 1973, 328). “As a consequence [writes a historian of the¶ Enlightenment] even Kant—who repudiated all but the most abstract religion, who condemned enthusiasm and refused to engage in any¶ religious observance —even Kant himself paid Pietism the unconscious tribute of incorporating some of its teachings into his work: ... its¶ conviction that religion depends not on dogma or ritual or prayer but on experience” (Gay 1973, 28-29). Of course, Pietism was not the¶ major form of Protestant religion, either then or in succeeding centuries. But the apolitical, noninstitutional character of early German Pietism¶ was not exceptional in the development of eighteenth-century European religiosity.¶ 151¶ Historians of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe have begun to recount how the constitution of the modern state required the¶ forcible redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identity as personal matters that belong to the newly emerging¶ space of private (as opposed to public) life. In the eyes of those who wanted a strong, centralized state, the disorders of the Reformation¶ proved that religious belief was the source of uncontrollable passions within the individual and of dangerous strife within the commonwealth.¶ It could not, for this reason, provide an institutional basis for a common morality—still less a public language of rational criticism. More¶ aggressively, Hobbes contended that institutionalized religion—but not the prince—was a vested interest, and that consequently it had to be¶ subordinated to the monarch.¶ 152¶ In this way, Hobbes postulated the unity and sovereignty of the modern state.¶ Scholars are now more aware that religious toleration was a political means to the formation of strong state power that emerged from the¶ sectarian wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rather than the gift of a benign intention to defend pluralism. As contemporaries¶ recognized, the locus of intolerance had shifted. “L‘heresie n’est plus auiourd‘huy en la Religion,” insisted a French jurist of the period, “elle¶ est en l’Estat” (cited in Koselleck 1985, 8).¶ According to Lipsius (Oestreich 1982), the influential religious skeptic writing at the end of the sixteenth century, the prince should follow¶ any policy that would secure civil peace regardless of moral or legal scruples. If religious diversity could be forcibly eliminated, so much the¶ better, Lipsius urged; if that was impossible, then religious toleration should be enforced by the state. ¶ 153¶ Locke’s famous argument for¶ religious toleration a century later was similarly motivated by a concern for the integrity and power of the state: it was because he considered¶ the beliefs of Catholics and atheists dangerous to civil peace that he thought they should not be tolerated by the state (Mendus 1989, 22-43).¶ Not only were religious beliefs now constitutionally subordinated to the state, but the principles of morality were henceforth to be¶ theorized separately from the domain of politics.¶ 154¶ In practice, of course, things were always more complicated. Some historians have even¶ argued that the Enlightenment broke precisely on this point with absolutism and initiated a new tradition. Thus, according to Koselleck¶ (1988), the philosophes (including Kant) helped to push the demands of a transcendent secular moralism into the domain of political practice.¶ 155¶ By the time we get to Kant, one can see how a private religion of sentimental sociability was beginning to take the place of a public¶ religion of passionate conviction. It has become a commonplace among historians of modern Europe to say that religion was gradually¶ compelled to concede the domain of public power to the constitutional state, and of public truth to natural science.¶ 156¶ But perhaps it is also¶ possible to suggest that in this movement we have the construction of religion as a new historical object: anchored in personal experience,¶ expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and practiced in one’s spare time.¶ 157¶ This construction of religion ensures¶ that it is part of what is inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality. More strongly put: religion is what actually or¶ potentially divides us, and if followed with passionate conviction, may set us intolerantly against one another.¶ Of course, the concepts and practices of religion and state have not remained unchanged since Kant. But liberals continue to invoke his¶ principle of the public use of reason as the arbiter of true knowledge (even when they do not accept all his philosophical doctrines) and¶ remain alert to the disruptive possibilities of religion as defined—for Christian as well as non-Christian traditions—by the Enlightenment.¶ The formation of strong state power in the contemporary Middle East has a very different genealogy. In most cases, strong states have¶ inherited colonial forms; a few owe their formation to Islamic movements. In such polities, there is no public use of reason in Kant’s sense,¶ nor are religious truth and religious criticism typically regarded by their public spokesmen as matters properly confined to the personal¶ domain. This is not to say that non-Enlightenment societies do not know what reasoned criticism is, or that nonliberal governments can never¶ permit the public expression of political dissent. On the contrary: institutionalized forms of criticism, made accessible to anonymous readers¶ and listeners, are integral to many non-Enlightenment states. Among them is contemporary Saudi Arabia.

#### Specifically, debate’s focus on policy action is a manifestation of epistemic racism that reasserts the superiority of Western institutions and norms over Islamic thought and recreates the racial profiling responsible for detention

Grosfoguel 10 (Ramón Grosfoguel, Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 5, 2010, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol8/iss2/5, da 11-15-13) PC

The importance of this discussion about epistemic Islamophobia is that the latter is manifested in contemporary debates and public policy. The epistemic racism and its derivative Eurocentric fundamentalism in social theory are manifested in discussions about human rights and democracy today. “Non-Western” epistemologies that define human rights and human dignity in different terms than the West are considered inferior to “West- ern” hegemonic definitions and, thus, excluded from the global conversation about these questions. If Islamic philosophy and thought are portrayed as inferior to the West by Eurocentric thinkers and classical social theory, then the logical con- sequence is that they have nothing to con- tribute to the question of democracy and human rights and should be not only excluded from the global conversation, but repressed. The underlying Western-centric view is that Muslims can be part of the discussion as long as they stop thinking as Muslims and take the hegemonic Eurocentric liberal definition of democracy and human rights. Any Muslim that attempts to think these questions from within the Islamic tradition is immediately suspicious of fundamentalism. Islam and democracy or Islam and Human Rights are considered in the hegemonic Eurocentric “common sense” an oxymoron.¶ The incompatibility between Islam and democracy has as its foundation the epistemic inferiorization of the Muslim world views. Today an artillery of epistemic racist “experts” in the West talks with authority about Islam, with no serious knowledge of the Islamic tradition. The ste- reotypes and lies repeated over and over again in Western press and magazines ends up, like in Goebbels’ Nazi theory of propa- ganda, being believed as truth. As Edward Said said not too long time ago:¶ A corps of experts on the Islamic world has grown to prominence, and during a crisis they are brought out to pontificate on formulaic ideas about Islam on news pro- grams or talk shows. There also seems to have been a strange revival of canonical, though previ- ously discredited, Orientalist ideas about Muslim, generally non- white, people—ideas which have achieved a startling prominence at a time when racial or religious mis- representations of every other cul- tural group are no longer circulated with such impunity. Malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West; what is said about Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orien- tals, or Asians.... My contention... is that most of this is unacceptable generalization of the most irrespon- sible sort, and could never be used for any other religious, cultural, or demographic group on earth. What we expect from the serious study of Western societies, with its complex theories, enormously variegated analyses of social structures, histo- ries, cultural formations, and sophisticated languages of investi- gation, we should also expect from the study and discussion of Islamic societies in the West. (Said 1998: xi- xvi)¶ The circulation of these stereotypes contributes to the portrayal of Muslims as racially inferior, violent creatures—thus, its easy association with “terrorism” and representation as “terrorist.”

#### Western epistemology relies on the Cartesian construction of a subject who views arguments from the point-zero perspective, separating their truth-claims from their point of view – this roots knowledge production in the perspective of the Western conqueror, which causes the Islamic Other to be framed as inferior and makes racist policies inevitable.

Grosfoguel and Mielants 6 (Ramón Grosfoguel, University of California - Berkeley, and Eric Mielants, Fairfield University, The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5:Iss. 1, Article 2., 23 September 2006, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2, da 10-12-13) PC

Occidentalism created the epistemic privilege and hegemonic identity politics of the West from which to judge and produce knowledge about the “Others.” The ego- politics of knowledge of Rene Descartes in the 17th century where Western men replace God as the foundation of knowledge is the foundational basis of modern Western philosophy. However as Enrique Dussel (1994), Latin American philosopher of liberation, reminds us, Descartes’ ego-cogito (“I think, therefore I am”) was preceded by 150 years of the ego-conquirus (“I conquer, therefore I am”). The God-eye view defended by Descartes transferred the attributes of the Christian God to Western men (the gender here is not accidental). But this was only possible from an Imperial Being, that is, from the panoptic gaze of someone who is at the center of the world because he has conquered it.¶ The myth about Western males’ capacity to produce a knowledge that is universal beyond time and space was fundamental to imperial/global designs. The Cartesian ego-politics of knowledge inaugurated what Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez called the “point zero” perspective. The “point zero” perspective is the Western¶ myth of a point of view that assumes itself to be beyond a point of view. This myth allowed Western men to claim their knowledge to be universal, neutral, value-free and objective. Contemporary authors like Sam- uel Huntington (1996) reproduce a combination of old Occidentalism with Orientalism. The superiority of the West is taken for granted and the epistemic privilege of Western identity politics from which to produce judgments of the “Other” and global/imperial designs around the world is an unquestioned presupposition. Moreover, in a male dominated academic culture such as Harvard, a scholar and national defense apolo- gist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to ‘internal’ American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ulti- mately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).¶ What is the relevance of this epistemic discussion to Islamophobia? It is from Western hegemonic identity politics and epistemic privilege that the ‘rest’ of the epistemologies and cosmologies in the world are subalternized as myth, religion and folklore, and that the downgrading of any form of non-Western knowledge occurs. The former leads to epistemic racism, that is, the inferiorization and subalternization of non-Western knowledge, while the latter leads to Orientalism. It is also from this hegemonic epistemic location that Western thinkers produce Orientalism about Islam. The sub-alternization and inferiorization of Islam were not merely a downgrading of Islam as spirituality, but also as an epistemology.¶ Islamic critical thinkers are considered inferior to the Western/Christian thinkers. The superiority of Western epistemology allows the West to construct with authority the Islamic “Other” as an inferior people or culture frozen in time, and leads Western scholars to write entire books about what went wrong with Islam (e.g. Lewis 2002), as if problems in the Middle East or poverty in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their region, effectively turning the ‘Islamic World’ into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the Orientalization of Islam. This is crucial because Islamophobia as a form of racism is not exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western global/imperial designs. The thinking coming from non-Western locations is not considered worthy of attention except to represent it as “uncivilized,” “primitive,” “barbarian,” and “backward.” Epistemic racism allows the West to unilaterally decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue. Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only manifested in the labor market, education, public sphere, global war against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological battleground about the definition of the priorities of the world today.¶ Recent events such as the September 11 attacks on American soil, the riots in Parisian “banlieues,” anti-immigrant xenophobia, the demonstrations against Danish cartoons of the Prophet, the bombing of London metro stations, the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, the resistance of Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11), and the nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some ex- ceptions such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.¶ Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.

#### This causes Islamic threat construction in debates about Presidential War Powers, which creates a self-fulfilling prophecy – historically discourse about Islam being incompatible with Western values was coopted to establish authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia and deployed by Orientalists to justify the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bottici and Challand 6 (Chiara Bottici, University of Florence, and Benoît Challand, European University Institute, Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 2006, European Journal of Social Theory 9(3): 315–336) PC

As Talal Asad also observed (2003), the construction of an Islamic threat, which began long before 9/11 and even Huntington’s book, is precisely the result of the application of modern Western categories and as such it becomes impossible to disentangle the two processes. For instance, Asad emphasizes that the zealotry so characteristic of many Islamic political movements in recent times as well as their ideal of an Islamic state, in which no distinction operates between state and religion, is not a product of the mainstream historical tradition of Islam. Rather, in his view, it is the product of the totalizing ambitions typical of modern politics and of the modernizing state. As he shows in his work, in the Islamic history, ‘there was no such thing as a state in the modern sense’. This is not to say that the fact that many contemporary Islamist movements have endorsed the idea is irrelevant – which is obviously not the case. It simply means that the fact that many Islamic militants have accepted this perspective as their own, striving for the establishment of an Islamic state, does not make it essential to Islam (Asad, 2003: 352).18¶ On the other hand, this essentialization of Islam favoured and most of the time went hand in hand with an over-emphasis on its intrinsic violence. This image of an essentially violent Islam is, in Asad’s view, the reflex of a perceived threat to Western values.19 The violence of Islamist radical movements is taken as a symbol of the violence of Islam itself, whereas¶ no liberal in the west would suggest that the Gush Emunim [‘Block of the Faithful’, a Jewish pro-settler group in Israel] represent the essence of Judaism, or that the assassination of abortion doctors in the U.S. by pro-Life activists represents the essence of Christianity. (Asad, 2003: 350)¶ The fact that many Islamic militants have reinterpreted the idea of an Islamic state as part of their Islamic tradition points to the parallel process of construction of an Islamic civilization on the part of the Muslims. ‘Orientalism’, which was born in the West, has also been re-appropriated by non-Western individuals, scholars or not. For instance, in 1992, the Saudi King Fahd declared that ‘the prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this region, for our peoples’ composition and traits are different from the traits of that world’ (quoted in Sadowski, 1993: 14).20 Other neighbouring countries nowadays use this type of argument, according to which Arab citizens are convinced on a daily basis that democracy is not possible in their country. Similar arguments are frequently found in the literature produced by ‘oriental orientalists’ or ‘westernized orientalists’, to use the expression coined by Sadiki (2004): Ajami (2002) has become a mouthpiece for Arab support of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, predicting that US soldiers would be greeted with flowers in Iraq, and Zakaria (1997) wrote abundantly about illiberal democracies in the region.¶ The clash of civilizations is not just a Western political myth that has been exported and imposed on the non-Western world. The work on this myth is a work that has taken place in different contexts, each time assuming different connotations and providing significance to very different political conditions: from Al-Qa’eda terrorists incited by their leaders to violent acts against the ‘impure West’ to the re-elaboration of the post-9/11 shock all around the world.¶ The consequences of the work of this myth in Arab countries are well illuminated by Telhami (2004). In his view, there has always been a variety of political possibilities for self-identification in the Arab worlds – at least, just to mention some of the most important, pan-Arabism, Islam and nationalism as embedded in single individual states. However, a survey he conducted in June 2004 in six Arab countries revealed that more and more Arabs identify themselves as Muslims first. Telhami observed that this trend is pretty clear, even though it is not uniform, given that in Egypt and Lebanon, in contrast to Saudi Arabia and Morocco, people identify themselves as Egyptians and Lebanese more than Arabs and Muslims.¶ A parallel increase in the role of religion can be witnessed in Western countries.21 Some, for instance, have noticed the increasing role of religious arguments in public and political debates. Well-known examples are the recurrence of debates on religious symbols such as the crucifix or veils in European schools, the role of religious lobbies in US politics, or recently, the debate that took place in Europe about the inclusion or not of reference to the Christian roots in the drafting of the European Constitution. However, what is more interesting for us is the increased symbolic presence of religious icons of the clash between civilizations. For instance, the revival of the interest in the epoch of the Crusades, as proved by the increasing number of exhibitions and films devoted to this theme, has made of them and of figures such as Richard the Lion-Heart conspicuous symbols that capture and reproduce significance for a ‘West’ in search of the roots of its ‘civilization’ (Seib, 2004: 76). Similarly, new illustrated copies of the Bible and the Koran are being offered by even the most secular newspapers in Italy (see La Repubblica and La Nazione), whereas the figure of Christ has returned to the scene of Hollywood with a new blockbuster film (see e.g. The Passion of the Christ by Mel Gibson).

#### Our critical analysis is key – efforts to exclude the affirmative replicate censorship by the Bush Administration to stifle opposition to the reductionist ideology of the clash of civilizations responsible for a self-fulfilling prophecy

Bottici and Challand 6 (Chiara Bottici, University of Florence, and Benoît Challand, European University Institute, Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 2006, European Journal of Social Theory 9(3): 315–336) PC

Surprisingly, the idea of a clash of civilizations, when it first appeared, was strongly criticized, not to say simply dismissed by most of the scholarly literature. For instance, Huntington’s understanding of civilizations has been criticized because it surreptitiously assumes that internal variety can be classified under the one heading of ‘civilization’ (Arnason, 2001). In reply to his theory, other scholars stated that it was a clash of interests and not of cultures that had shaped contemporary politics (Gerges, 1999). Finally, others pointed out that he leaves politics out of the picture for a mistaken over-emphasis on cultural factors and that, for instance, the ongoing struggle between the United States and Islamic radicals is not the result of a clash between civilizations but rather of the behaviour of extremist groups preying upon discontent within Muslim majority states (Kupchan, 2002: 70).¶ Notwithstanding those criticisms, people increasingly came to believe that a clash between civilizations was taking place. Two independent surveys of the US media reaction to the 9/11 attacks showed that the totality of these events was framed within the paradigm of the clash of civilizations (Abrahamian, 2003; Seib, 2004). As a consequence, Huntington’s book became a bestseller to the point that by 2002 Netscape was offering Internet surfers free copies (Abrahamian, 2003: 529).¶ For example, immediately after the attacks, the New York Times launched a new section entitled ‘A Nation Challenged’ which appeared every day for the next four months. The titles of the articles appearing in this section mostly referred to a clash between Islam and the West: ‘Yes, this is about Islam’, ‘Jihad 101’, ‘Barbarians at the gates’, ‘The force of Islam’, ‘The core of Muslim rage’, ‘Dreams of Holy War’, ‘The deep intellectual roots of Islamic rage’, ‘The age of Muslim wars’, ‘This is a religious war’ (Abrahamian, 2003). This latter article was illustrated with pictures of atrocities from medieval Europe, including Goya’s Spanish Inquisition (Sullivan, 2001). Similarly, an article in the Washington Post written by an expert on religion, warned that the government should take care to respect Islam because its ‘awakening’ had pitted a huge section of the world against the West. The article was entitled ‘A Fervor America Should Easily Recog- nise’ and was accompanied by a photo of hooded men carrying the Koran and a hatchet (Morgan, 2001).¶ All these titles referred to cultural and religious factors, leaving political explanations completely aside. In contrast to their European counterparts, who invoked the US and European policies in the Middle East as a major source of explanations for the attacks (see e.g. Halliday, 2001; Fisk, 2001), the US media played down all attempts to bring politics back to the forefront. According to Thomas Friedman (2002), the ‘highjackers left no demands because they had none at all’. In his view, these terrorists had no political demands because their real driving force was Muslim rage against Western civilization. All the evidence pointing to the political dimensions of the attacks was ignored if not actively deleted from the leading headlines. For instance, at the beginning of Bin Laden’s first tape relayed by al-Jazeerah, he explicitly stated that the highjackers’ motivation was precisely ‘the 80 years of wars’ waged in the Middle East, but the White House advised the media not to broadcast such ‘inflammatory propaganda’ and the media agreed to edit future tapes too (Carter, 2001). Another tape released by Bin Laden, in which he explicitly affirmed that the aim of the attacks was, among others, ‘to avenge our people killed in Palestine’ was not even aired in the USA. It came to be known only through its publication in Europe and Blair’s mentioning it in a press conference in the States (Abrahamian, 2003: 536).8¶ But how can it be that a theory that has been so strongly criticized as too simplistic has become such a successful narrative through which so many people read the contemporary world? This was the result of a work on the narrative of the clash between civilizations that started long before September 11 and that took place, as we will see, in the media as well as in intellectual discourses and other kind of social practices. The result of this work, which has actually intensified after 9/11, is that this narrative has become one of the most powerful images through which people both in Western and non-Western societies perceive the world and act within it. For instance, if by September 2001, as we have seen, European newspapers were reluctant to adopt this scheme, by December 2004 an article appearing in The Times openly stated that ‘Islamic fundamentalism is causing a clash of civilizations between liberal democracies and Muslims’ (Bremner, 2004). Even more striking, an Ipsos poll quoted in the¶ same article revealed that 48% of Italians believed that a ‘clash of civilizations’ was under way and that ‘Islam is a religion more fanatical than any other’ (Bremner, 2004).¶ In order to show the mechanisms through which this change has happened, one must not only look at what is explicitly said about the clash of civilizations and the threat of Islam. The work on myth takes place on a much more subtle level, placed between what is consciously learned and what is unconsciously apprehended by exposure to it.

#### This space is key—interrogating Islamophobia in educational settings is critical to establish a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects\*\*

Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology

[Jan. 04 2012, Shirin Housee works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1]

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### The aff is a logical pre-requisite to better policymaking – without a criticism of the way we construct the Muslim identity, legal reformism is doomed to failure. That criticism is impossible under current policy-making frameworks, because they reaffirm Western norms and posit Muslims and non-Western institutions as antithetical to those norms.

Volpp 2 (Leti Volpp, Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 2002, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575) PC

In the American imagination, those who appear "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" may be theoretically entitled to formal rights, but they do not stand in for or represent the nation. Instead, they are interpellated as antithetical to the citizen's sense of identity. Citizenship in the form of legal status does not guarantee that they will be constitutive of the American body politic. In fact, quite the opposite: The consolidation of American identity takes place against them.¶ While many scholars approach citizenship as identity as if it were derivative of citizenship's other dimensions, it seems as if the guarantees of citizenship as status, rights, and politics are insufficient to produce citizenship as identity. n78 Thus, one may formally be a U.S. citizen and formally entitled to various legal guarantees, but one will stand outside of the membership of kinship/solidarity that structures the U.S. nation. And clearly, falling outside of the identity of the "citizen" can reduce the ability to exercise citizenship as a political or legal matter. Thus, the general failure to identify people who appear "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" as constituting American [\*1595] national identity reappears to haunt their ability to enjoy citizenship as a matter of rights, in the form of being free from violent attack.¶ Thus, the boundaries of the nation continue to be constructed through excluding certain groups. The "imagined community" n79 of the American nation, constituted by loyal citizens, is relying on difference from the "Middle Eastern terrorist" to fuse its identity at a moment of crisis. Discourses of democracy used to support the U.S. war effort rest on an image of anti-democracy, in the form of those who seek to destroy the "American way of life." n80 The idea that there are norms that are antithetical to "Western values" of liberty and equality helps solidify this conclusion.¶ We can consider whether the way in which identity disrupts citizenship is inevitable. Race has fundamentally contradicted the promise of liberal democracy, including citizenship. While liberalism claimed to promise universal liberty and equality, these were in fact only guaranteed to propertied, European male subjects. n81 While some might believe in the promise of universality - that one can infinitely expand the ambit of who is entitled to rights and freedoms - race and other markers appear and reappear to patrol the borders of belonging to political communities. n82 Despite the liberal universalizing [\*1596] discourse of citizenship, not all citizens are equal. n83 These events make apparent how identity in the form of foreignness, or perpetual extraterritorialization, n84 means that the circling of wagons is an uneven process, that drawing tighter together takes place through the expulsion of some.¶ Recent theorizing about diasporic or transnational subjects, while productive in many regards, has on occasion minimized the continued salience of the nation, both in terms of shaping identity and in the form of governmental control. n85 In particular, discussions charting the decline of the nation-state have led to unfortunate implications when two points are stretched to extremes: First, the idea that immigrant communities have complete [\*1597] agency in determining their location and their national identity; and second, the idea that the borders of the nation can be traversed with the greatest of ease and are so reduced as to become almost meaningless. n86¶ Arjun Appadurai, in an essay titled Patriotism and its Futures, written at what was perhaps a more optimistic moment, suggests that we "need to think ourselves beyond the nation," for we now find ourselves in a postnational era. n87 America, he suggests, is "eminently suited to be a sort of cultural laboratory and a free trade zone" to test a "world organized around diasporic diversity." n88 Appadurai argues that the United States should be considered "yet another diasporic switching point, to which people come to seek their fortunes but are no longer content to leave their homelands behind." n89¶ If only this were indeed a postnational era. In a response, titled Transnationalism and its Pasts, Kandice Chuh criticizes the evenness of power relations within and across national borders implied in Appadurai's postnation. n90 Chuh emphasizes the link between transnationalism and state coercion, and reminds us of the forced removal and internment of Japanese Americans by the U.S. government during World War II. n91 A transnational extension of Japan into the United States was relied upon to justify this dispossession. This memory is instructive to us now. We should remember that the idea of transnationality is not solely one where immigrants function as agents in maintaining diasporic ties, but can be one where a state or its people brands its citizens with foreign membership, extraterritorializing them into internment [\*1598] camps, or ejecting them from membership through violence against their bodies. n92¶ We function not just as agents of our own imaginings, but as the objects of others' exclusions. Despite frequent rhetorical claims, this society is neither colorblind nor a happy "nation of immigrants." Certain racialized bodies are always marked and disrupt the idea of integration or assimilation. n93

#### **Discourse and representations matter – they are the basis for war.** What we lack is not a proper scientific or empirical challenge to violence; we lack the cultural critics willing to fight the fear mongering which results in war. As scholars, we have an obligation to refuse and problematize the cultural grammar of risk.

Elliot, ‘12

[Emory, University Professor of the University of California and Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside, Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open Humanities Press, Online, RSR]

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II: In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere. In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruc- tion, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demon- strations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relation- ships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable dis- cussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward po- larized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist re- ligious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.